Several theories of task switching assume that basic task processes such as stimulus identification and response selection do not contribute to task-switch costs. This conclusion is mainly based on the finding that stimulus-identification manipulations have no influence on the size of the switch cost. The present study tested the influence of response-selection manipulations on the size of the switch cost. The authors manipulated the difficulty of response selection by using a semantically based response-side effect that is associated with numerical-judgement tasks, namely the Spatial Numerical Association of Response Codes (SNARC) effect. The authors observed a SNARC effect and a switch cost, but no interaction between the two: the task-switch cost did not differ between SNARC-compatible and -incompatible responses. The authors conclude that response selection does not contribute to the switch cost on the current trial, which provides further support for the idea that basic task processes and task-switch processes are separate.
Many researchers assume that cognitive flexibility depends on executive processes that coordinate and schedule routine actions (e.g., Norman & Shallice, 1986) . Routine actions involve simple cognitive abilities that are performed when triggered by the environment. While routine actions can account for basic task performance, they are insufficient when facing novel situations and situations in which more than one task can be performed. In such situations, higher-level control processes have to intervene to regulate behaviour in an adequate way (Baddeley, 1996) .
The distinction between (more basic) task processes and control processes is prominent in task switching. When switching between tasks, task switches are typically slower and less accurate than performance on task repetitions (i.e., the switch cost). The common idea is that when subjects switch from one task to another, additional control processes are required to configure and protect the cognitive system such that the new task can be performed (e.g., Altmann & Gray, 2008; Logan & Gordon, 2001; Mayr & Kliegl, 2000 Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Rubinstein, Meyer, & Evans, 2001; Sohn & Anderson, 2001 ). For instance, Rubinstein et al. (2001) proposed that basic task processes comprise information-processing stages such as stimulus identification, response selection, and response execution. On task repetitions, basic task processes are sufficient for successful behaviour. However, on task switches, additional processes are required: When switching tasks, a goal shift is made prior to stimulus identification and task rules are activated prior to response selection (Rubinstein et al., 2001 ). These additional control processes support task switching, but are time consuming and entail switch costs. In a similar vein, Kliegl (2000, 2003) proposed that only one set of task rules can be maintained in working memory. On task repetitions, the same set of task rules is reused, and no additional control processes are needed. By contrast, on task switches additional control is required to retrieve the now-relevant task rules from long-term memory (LTM).
The aforementioned accounts thus assume that the switch cost reflects the duration of additional control involved in task switching and is not influenced by basic task processes. Consistent with this idea, manipulations of switch-related control processes such as goal shifting, rule activation, and rule retrieval influence the switch cost, whereas manipulations of stimulus identification do not influence the switch cost. Rubinstein et al. (2001) observed larger switch costs for tasks requiring complex categorization rules than for tasks requiring simple categorization rules. Similarly, Mayr and Kliegl (2000) observed larger switch costs for tasks with higher LTM-retrieval demands. In contrast, several studies showed that the switch cost was unaffected by manipulations of the difficulty of stimulus identification (e.g., by degrading stimulus visibility; Liefooghe, Barrouillet, Vandierendonck, & Camos, 2008; Rubinstein et al., 2001 ).
The conclusion that basic task processes do not contribute to the task-switch cost is primarily supported by studies that manipulated stimulus processing demands and the role of other basic task processes has been neglected so far. In the present study, we examined whether response-selection demands influenced the switch cost. More than other basic task processes, response selection is constrained by the limited capacity of the cognitive system (e.g., Pashler, 1994) and calls on executive-control processes (Barrouillet, Portrat, Bernardin, Vergauwe, & Camos, 2007; Rohrer, & Pashler, 2003; Szmalec, Vandierendonck, & Kemps, 2005) . Ac-cordingly, a test of the contribution of response selection to the switch cost is pertinent.
We investigated the contribution of response selection to the switch cost by manipulating response-selection difficulty and tested whether increasing the difficulty of response selection also increases the switch cost. To this end, we examined the effect of response selection demands in numerical-judgement tasks such as magnitude and parity judgements. Dehaene, Bossini, and Giraux (1993) demonstrated that responding to numbers in such tasks is facilitated when small numbers are mapped on a left response and large numbers are mapped on a right response, compared to when the opposite mapping is used. They referred to this effect as the Spatial Numerical Association of Response Codes or SNARC effect and argued that it is caused by a correspondence between number representations in LTM and the left-right response position: small numbers are associated with left-sided responses and large numbers are associated with right-sided responses. This results in SNARC-compatible responses (left response ϭ small number; right response ϭ large number) and SNARCincompatible responses (left response ϭ large number; right response ϭ small number). Many studies observed SNARC compatibility in both magnitude and parity judgement tasks and demonstrated that the SNARC-compatibility effect is resolved during response selection (e.g., Keus, Jenks, & Schwarz, 2005; .
To examine whether task-switch performance was influenced by the difficulty of response selection, we tested if the switch cost was similar on SNARC-compatible and -incompatible responses when subjects had to switch between magnitude and parity judgements. If increasing the difficulty of response selection does influence the size of the switch cost, then the switch cost should be larger on SNARC-incompatible responses than on SNARC-compatible responses. By contrast, if increasing the difficulty of response selection does not affect the switch cost, then the switch cost should be similar on SNARC-compatible and -incompatible responses.
Method

Participants
Seventy-nine first-year students at Ghent University participated for payment. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, were right-handed, and were naive as to the purpose of the experiment.
Materials
Stimuli were the digits 1 to 9, except 5. Participants had to perform a magnitude task (Is a number smaller or larger than 5?) or a parity task (Is a number odd or even?). Responses were "Q" (i.e., left-sided response) and "P" (i.e., right-sided response) of a QWERTY keyboard. Two category-response mappings were possible for the magnitude task (small ϭ left and large ϭ right; or large ϭ left and small ϭ right) and for the parity task (odd ϭ left and even ϭ right; or even ϭ left and odd ϭ right). On each trial the category-response mapping was cued prior to the stimulus onset. Mapping cues were presented randomly in a task-cueing procedure (Meiran, 1996) . In the parity task, cues were "On-Ev" or "Ev-On"; "on" is the Dutch abbreviation of odd ("oneven"), "ev" is the abbreviation of even ("even"). In the magnitude task, cues were "La-Ho" or "Ho-La"; "la" is the Dutch abbreviation of low ("laag"), "ho" is the abbreviation of high ("hoog"). The cue indicated both the task and the mapping (e.g., 'Lo-Hi' indicated that low ϭ left and high ϭ right). The digits were presented between the abbreviations (e.g., "Lo 9 Hi"). Cues and digits were presented in a white Arial font with size 16 and 18, respectively.
The different mappings resulted in SNARC-compatible and -incompatible responses in both tasks (see Table 1 ), and in three types of transitions: complete repetitions (the repetition of a task and its mapping), mapping switches (the repetition of a task and the switching of the mapping), and task switches (the switching of a task, which is automatically a switching of the mapping). SNARC-compatible and -incompatible responses occurred with equal probability for these three transition types.
Procedure
The participants were tested in groups of three to five by means of Pentium III personal computers with 17-inch colour monitors running Tscope (Stevens, Lammertyn, Verbruggen, & Vandierendonck, 2005) . The instructions were presented on screen and paraphrased if necessary.
A block of 25 practise trials was followed by 8 blocks of 81 test trials with a small break after each block. Each trial started with the presentation of one of the four cues in the centre of the screen. After a cue-target interval (CTI) of 150 ms the target digit appeared between the abbreviations of the cue. Cue and target remained on screen until a response was given or a maximum reaction time (RT) of 3,000 ms had elapsed, after which both the stimulus and the cue disappeared and a 1,500 ms intertrial interval started. For incorrect responses the screen turned red for 200 ms before the intertrial interval started.
Results
Incorrect trials, trials following incorrect trials, and trials with RTs smaller than 100 ms were discarded from the RT analysis (7.5%). RTs and error rates were subjected to a 3 (transition type: complete repetition, mapping switch, task switch) by 2 (response compatibility: SNARC-compatible vs. -incompatible) repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA; ␣ ϭ .05). Mean RTs and error rates are presented in Table 2 . Corresponding SEs were 
Additional Analysis
We did not find an interaction between task switching and the SNARC-compatibility effect despite the high number of subjects. However, the absence of an interaction between task switching and the SNARC effect could be due to the overall small SNARC effect (13 ms for RTs). Therefore, we performed a median-split analysis based on participants' SNARC effect and reanalyzed the data for the participants (n ϭ 40) with a SNARC effect larger than the median SNARC effect. The SNARC effect in this group was 40 ms, F(1, 39) ϭ 102.59, p 2 ϭ .72. Despite the larger SNARC effect, SNARC compatibility and transition type did not interact, F Ͻ 1. As shown in Figure 1 , neither the task-switch cost and the mapping-switch cost differed for SNARC-compatible and -incompatible responses. For the error rates, the SNARC effect and the interaction were not significant, Fs Ͻ 1.
Discussion
We found no interaction between task switching and SNARC compatibility: the task-switch cost was similar for SNARCcompatible and -incompatible responses. This suggests that response-selection processes do not contribute to the size of the switch costs. This provides further support for the idea that task processes do not contribute to the switch cost, which is a common assumption in task switching.
Our results suggest that the cause of the switch cost is to be situated outside these basic task processes, in additional control processes. Yet, the present results do not permit us to pinpoint the exact nature of these additional processes. In this perspective, we are aware that it is heavily debated if the switch cost is caused by executive processes such as goal shifting, rule activation or longterm memory retrieval (Mayr & Kliegl, 2000 Rubinstein et al., 2001) or if the switch cost reflects processes compensating for the interference issuing from previously activated task information (e.g., Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, 1994; Wylie & Allport, 2000) . Furthermore, the mere presence of executive processes during task switching has also been questioned by Logan and colleagues, who argued that the switch cost mainly reflects cue-encoding processes which are less automated on task switches than on task repetitions (e.g., Schneider & Logan, 2005) . Despite these differences, all theories assume that task switches require additional control. Clearly, the debate on the nature of the processes instantiating the task-switch cost is far from resolved; however, this does not overrule our conclusion that basic task processes such as stimulus identification and response selection do not seem to contribute much to the switch cost on the current trial.
We found no effect of response-selection demands on the size of the switch cost on the current trial. However, previous studies indicated that the response selection on the current trial contributes to the switch cost measured on the subsequent trial (Schuch & Koch, 2003; Verbruggen, Liefooghe, Szmalec, & Vandierendonck, 2005; Verbruggen, Liefooghe, & Vandierendonck, 2006) . These studies suggested that when a response is selected on the current trial, the irrelevant task is inhibited. This makes it harder to reaccess this task later on. Thus, response-selection processes do not influence the switch cost on the current trial but they influence the switch cost on the following trial(s). This idea is consistent with previous studies, which showed that processes causing the switch cost on a current trial may differ from processes affecting the switch cost on a subsequent trial (Arbuthnott & Woodward, 2002; Mayr, Diedrichsen, Ivry, & Keele, 2006; Mayr & Keele, 2000) . We did not test effects of response selection difficulty on the subsequent trial in the present study. The SNARCcompatibility effect is known to elicit serial adaptation processes (Notebaert & Verguts, 2008) and our design did not allow us to distinguish between effects of response-selection difficulty on trial n-1 and between-trial control adjustments.
Our results are consistent with findings of Meiran (2005) , who showed that the task-switch cost was not influenced by the Simoncompatibility effect, which is a spatial response-compatibility effect (i.e., responding is facilitated when the location of the stimulus and the response side correspond). However, Meiran (2005) used highly automated location-judgement tasks, in which responseselection demands may have been low. The present results add to these findings by showing that response-selection demands and task switching also do not interact when less automated tasks are used.
A final comment concerns the use of only one short CTI. We opted for this short CTI because we were interested in the interaction between switch-related processes and the SNARC compatibility effect, and we wanted a maximal overlap between switchrelated processes and basic task processes. When CTI is short, the switch cost is typically large because switch-related processes have to be completed when the stimulus is presented. However, when CTI is long, the switch cost typically decreases substantially and may disappear completely because switch-related processes can be completed before the stimulus is presented (see, Verbruggen, Liefooghe, Vandierendonck, & Demanet, 2007) . As such, observing an interaction between SNARC compatibility and task switching seems unlikely for a long CTI, especially since we found no such interaction for a short CTI.
To conclude, our results support the idea that basic task processes such as stimulus identification, response selection and response execution may affect task performance without influencing the switch cost (e.g., Mayr & Kliegl, 2000; Rubinstein et al., 2001) . In previous studies, this conclusion was based on the observation that the switch cost was unaffected by manipulations of stimulus-identification processes (Liefooghe et al., 2008; Mayr & Kliegl, 2000; Rubinstein et al., 2001) . In the present study, we could demonstrate that the switch cost is also unaffected by manipulations of response-selection difficulty. More generally, our findings imply that the cause of the switch cost is to be situated in a set of processes that is distinct from basic task processes.
Résumé
Plusieurs théories de l'alternance de tâche supposent que les processus fondamentaux d'une tâche comme l'identification du stimulus et la sélection de la réponse ne contribuent pas au coût de l'alternance de tâche. Cette conclusion repose principalement sur le fait que les manipulations d'identification du stimulus n'ont pas d'influence sur la magnitude du coût. Les auteurs ont manipulé la difficulté de la sélection de la réponse en utilisant un effet séman-tique de la réponse associé aux tâches de jugement numérique, appelé effet d'Association Spatiale et Numérique de Codes de Réponses (ASNCR). Les auteurs ont observé un effet d'ASNCR et un coût d'alternance, mais pas d'interaction entre les deux : le coût d'alternance ne différait pas entre les réponses ASNCRcompatible et-incompatible. Les auteurs concluent que la sélec-tion de la réponse ne contribue pas au coût d'alternance pour l'essai en cours, ce qui fournit un appui additionnel à l'idée selon laquelle les processus fondamentaux d'une tâche et les processus d'alternance sont séparés.
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